When good icons go bad: Why Harley will struggle in the future

In the USA, motorcycles are only 3% of total road users—but 100% of the population would recognize the brand name Harley-Davidson. Not only that, most would assume that all street/cruisers are Harleys. So it’s no wonder that for well over a decade those in academia and the business world are enthralled by how Harley did it and the fanatical customer loyalty the brand inspires. As many Harley aficionados love to brag, who else tattoos a company’s logo onto their skin?

The brand identity became a straitjacket: And that’s exactly the problem; the brand identity became a straitjacket the Motor Company has not been able to escape. Because Harley was unimaginative, fearful and too focused on quarterly results rather than long-term sustainable success, Harley may very well end up courting bankruptcy for the third time in the next decade. But it’s current and future woes will not be because of the choices consumers make as adults but what they experienced as children.

First Encounter of the bonding kind: Marketing consultant and psychoanalyst Clotaire Rapaille is “convinced that a person’s first encounter with an object or idea shaped his or her emotional relationship with it for life.  In large part, he believed, this explained American’s fascination with the SUV.[i] It also begins to explain why men 40 and older love Harleys.

Particularly because research also shows that both men and women who start riding as adults admired an extended family member or a neighbor who rode and rode on the back at least once. Generally, that someone was younger than the child’s parents and, in all cases, that person was admired as “cool”.

From Brand to Iconic Brand Douglas B. Holt in How Brands Become Icons[ii] describes how certain brands tell a “story” that are confluence points of socio-cultural forces–something about that brand sums up much greater and more complicated things such as Apple, Coca-Cola, Nike–and Harley.

Harley the brand became Harley the icon, he wrote because the negatives in the image of motorcycling and motorcyclists were transformed into positives by changing the “story” the brand told:

The positive image of motorcycling The negative image of motorcyclists is such a cliché it needs no discussion. But what Holt failed to note was that there was also a powerful set of positive images associated with motorcycling and their riders in the culture when the current middle-aged Harley rider was young. For example, there were shows like Then Came Bronson and CHiPs which had a powerful influence on young men’s imaginations.

As John G. Hanhardt points out, “In films which the motorcycle features predominately, the biker/hero manifests a desire to control his destiny and expresses his independence from the state, invoking heroic themes that have always been a part of the mythology of the American way of life…the lone rider…was both a fearless and a vulnerable explorer, an independent hero who was confronted with problems he has to solve by himself.”[iii]

It wasn’t just movies such as The Wild One or Easy Rider or Harley Davidson and the Marlboro Man but ones like The Great Escape.

Films and TV, Hanhardt went on to write, showed the motorcyclist was “looking for himself within an increasingly industrialized and homogenized society. Although the motorcycle is occasionally demonized, it is overwhelmingly represented as the vehicle for romance with a youthful yearning for freedom.”

In many ways, that 50s-70s motorcyclist was the reinvention of the cowboy—something many have noted. Holt, though, particularly zeroes in on the gunfighter part of that myth that was later transformed by Reagan into “heroizing [sic] the rough-and-tumble gunfighters as men-of-action who can single handedly save the country.”

That kind of story would resonate with the men who grew up watching not just the bikers in those films and TV shows but westerns and WWII war films that also evoked those themes. Events in society such as the Cold War, JFK’s assassination and other factors also hit these same messages. At the same time, society was going through massive changes in the 60s and 70s. Regardless of whether one shared the political or social views espoused, the radical, the rebel, the one who boldly and publicly lived according to their point of view was lionized by the media. The man-of-action doing something rebellious was admirable—and cool—to the youth of America.

Three stages of Coming To Harley: That cohort grew up and some of them became the working class man in an age when production jobs were disappearing—and rice bikes were kicking up road debris in Harley’s face. The positive gunfighter image of the motorcyclist, Holt says, spoke to these men by giving them a positive “story” that was a counterpoint to what they saw happening in America.

Harley specifically fit that story: the last American made motorcycle was a symbol for these men holding on to American “frontier values against the alien ideals proposed by the middle-class people living on the coasts.” It was also the time of Easy Riders magazine and the rise of ABATE—and the last certainly fit the mold of the independent man fighting alien ideals. These were rebels with a cause.

But some of that age group that had been formed by those images grew up to be white collar professionals—a group that wasn’t affected by the loss of production jobs and so forth. The motorcycle didn’t resonate for them…yet. Things were good for them and then came the Reagan years and the recession.

The next step in the transformation began with Malcolm Forbes. According to Holt, Forbes “crafted the Harley gunfighter [rider] as a distinctly capitalistic figure. Harley riders were warriors championing capitalism and liberty in the face of socialist threats” who had the “virility to reinvigorate society with libertarian values…Being a man meant pursuing the life of a rugged individualist manager, as an entrepreneur willing to take death-defying risks bother professionally and personally.”

But, according to Holt, it was Reagan who, for his own purposes, utilized the American Frontier myth and the man-of-action gunfighter who could save the world—something very appealing to the middle-class (and business people). And, coincidentally saved Harley by instituting the infamous tariff. “Harley symbolized the revitalization of U.S. economic power that was possible….” And it worked—Harley was the embodiment of Forbes’ philosophy and Reaganomics. And the “story” the brand symbolized appealed to the upper-middle and upper class as well as the working and middle class: all men were Terminators, so to speak, astride a Harley. Between Forbes and Reagan, then the groundwork was laid for the Rich Urban Biker.

By the mid-1990s, then greater currents in American culture and the elevation of ideals that resonated with the image of the motorcyclist had created a perfect storm across all socio-economic classes of (white) Baby Boomer men who found that Harleys expressed something about who they were and what they believed in.

Co-Opted not Co-authored: But this transformed more socially acceptable image of the motorcyclist wasn’t the result of effort by the Motor Company. Holt (and many others) say the brand was “co-authored” by those who used it—that the consumer created the brand identity along with the company. It was a classic case of trickle up, however, where customers and culture were the creative ones who made Harleys relevant. Harley brilliantly recognized that and co-opted what consumers did and realized it was selling a dream, a lifestyle rather than just a product and cleverly marketed the dream during those years.

And here’s the thing: for many of the middle-aged riders, it really was the immaterial that they were purchasing—few of these Harley riders actually put many miles on the motorcycles they bought. It was what Harley stood for that they were buying, not the activity.

The very confluence of images and issues that made Harley so successful, however, assured that the brand would reach market saturation at this specific time in history and that  the seeds of future failure had been sown decades before.

The brand identity though was so strong and so set and so integrated with specific cultural forces and appealed so strongly to a specific narrow range of ages that it became inflexible and unable to adapt without the danger of alienating the customer base. Harley’s five-year task force in the mid-1990s recognized that and also identified another problem: the brand identity didn’t attract minorities, women or young men.

Translate to a new time or die: According to Holt, brands must be able to translate the core “story” to meet the new times to continue to be successful. Brands that cannot do it lose market share. But that’s where Harley failed: the very rigidity of the iconic image meant it wouldn’t appeal to minorities, women or young men:

The number of women Harley owners did expand over the past decade to 12%.[iv] However, as Harley said for years, it’s hard to tell how many ride themselves and how many are the owner of record due to a the man in their life’s poor credit record. And, according to Harley’s own demographics, women’s ownership flat-lined in 2005 at 12% and had only risen 1% since 2003—iow, Harley had hit market saturation with women three years before it hit it with (white) men. In 2009, however, the MIC Owner survey found that women were 23% of the riding population in 2008. These women had the same cultural background as the men who grew up to choose Harley. However there was Women’s Lib that influenced these women and there was—and still is—an undeniably chauvinistic and sexist image to Harleys that the Motor Company did nothing to counter even while attempting to attract women riders. This Easyriders Magazine cover “uncovers” alot of that disdain women have towards the Harley lifestyle image.

Much more can be said on why women do not respond to Harleys—but that can wait until another entry.

When it comes to minorities, there has been an vibrant motorcycling culture in the African-American and Latino cultures since at least WWII and it continues to grow.[v] Throughout its history, Harley hasn’t discouraged racial minorities from buying Harleys—however, for most of its existence, it did nothing to encourage them either. And the public perception of a link between Harleys and Hells Angels, who did not allow African-Americans to join, gave an appearance of racism.

Minority participation whether on Harleys or sport-type bikes has been urban-based and segregated—though why that is lies beyond the scope of this essay. The net result is that little is known about non-white Harley riders and the public perception is that Harley owners are overwhelmingly white—which is, in fact, the reality.

While Harley claims it has worked to increase minority participation, that’s not evident on the official Harley site.  No matter what link one clicks on, there’s photos of white men well over 30 and some women—but there was only one place where there’s and Latino or African-American presence is in the Rider’s Edge section. While three (white) women are heard among the four video clips and the one young (white) man, and one middle-aged Latino, the African-American who is in the class doesn’t nor does the older African-American on the range, which is simply odd.

There’s also one tiny picture of a black couple in the 2008 Annual Report on page 11, and Harley’s official demographics gives five years of data on age, gender and income—but not race.

Harley also intensely pursued a policy of big-box dealerships that moved them away from urban areas and coincidentally to areas with a high population of white residents.

Nor has Harley made an effort to raise the public profile of such African-American Harley-riding clubs or individual riders to the mainstream public. Worse, yet, Harley has even less appeal for young minority riders—and minority young women—than it does for white young adults.

Once again, this is not to say Harley is racist. It just appears that only older white men ride Harleys. By all appearances, then, Harley is a brand only white aging men can love. As the bulk of the Baby Boomer generation is now well over 40, this does not bode well for future company growth.

Short selling the stockholders: Yet according to the US Census, females are just over 50%, Blacks are 12.8%, Hispanic/Latinos are 15.4%. of the population. That’s an awful lot of potential market to fail to reach. Analysts have given more and more attention to Harley’s age problem but have not even noticed how white–and male–the brand identity is nor discussed how both those will affect the Motor Company’s future growth. Nor do stockholders appear to be aware of how inept Harley has been in trying to expand its market–or how blazingly successful other motorcycle manufacturers are at attracting the young, women and minorities.

More critical to Harley’s success or failure in the immediate future and beyond is why it doesn’t attract young men and women. And that’s the subject of the next entry.

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[i] Bradsher, Keith. High and Mighty: The Dangerous Rise of the SUV. Public Affairs Press. New York. 2002.

[ii] Holt, Douglas B. How Brands Become Icons. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA. 2004.

[iii] Hanhardt, John G.,“The Motorcycle on Screen”, Motorcycle Mania: The Biker Book. Guggenheim Museum. p.13. p. 99.

[iv] Various Harley documents give different numbers but most often one between 4-5% as women owners prior to 2003.

[v] See Black Motorcycle Clubs: http://www.blackmotorcycleclubs.net/ and the list of clubs available on a link there or list at http://www.blackrefer.com/black_motorcycle_clubs2.html but note that almost all of them are either all sports bikes or mixed and few (except those that are directly fostered by Harley) are strictly Harley clubs.

How the Harley blew it: 10 critical mistakes that will affect it both now and in the next boom cycle

Nothing, perhaps, illustrates the recklessness and incompetence that’s reigned at Harley-Davidson over the past several years than a glimpse at the operating income from last year at this point to this year at the same point for Harley-Davidson Financial Services (HDFS).

As you see, in this particular area HDFS turned completely upside down to the profit it made in 2008 (which was lower than it was in 2005).

While this may appear to be the result of the recession, it’s not—and neither is the lower shipments:

While both the recession and tighter credit requirements affected sales for a year, growth had been slowing since 2003 and had peaked in 2006.[i] The boom, then, was over for Harley at the end of 2006.[ii] By 2007, Harley’s shipments had dropped by 2.7% at the same point in the year. In 2008 they had dropped by 9% and this year, shipments were down 17.5%.

Growth had slowed for the Big Four as well but the boom persisted for smaller marques. And it persisted for motorcycles that were neither cruisers, customs or tourers. Those weren’t the kind of bike Harley made. It was, however, the kind of bike Buell made. The tiny subsidiary enjoyed an erratic growth while its huge brother was beginning to slide; Buell had 10% increase in shipments in 2006 with a 7.6% drop in 2007 and almost a 14% increase in 2008.

This indicates the Harley line had hit market saturation before the recession hit, while Buell—though shipments were miniscule—was still growing.

Iow, the recession and newborn bust cycle exacerbated rather than caused Harley’s troubles now—and in the future. In fact, the bust and recession reveal the mismanagement of one of America’s most famous brands.

Ten mistakes Harley-Davidson made

Five of them were bad business decisions—and some of them were shared by many corporations over the past few years. Some were simply errors in judgment—something shared by many businesses large and small:

• Subprime loan policy and dependency on securitization.
• Locking itself into a too-rigid conception of the brand;
• Buying MV Augusta too late then selling it as a temporary fix.
• Too slow to recognize the boom cycle and too slow to take advantage of it.
• Almost everything they did about Buell from first to last.

But five of them relate to a failure to understand motorcycling, which, after all is its core business:

• Mismanaging the dealer relationship;
• Misunderstanding how Harleys became Harleys;
• Inability to translate the brand for a new generation;
• Failure to produce an off-road bike;
• Failure to understand the Buell brand and how to position it;

These problems boils down to one simple thing: they treated Harley as if it was a business like any other.

Over the next few entries, we’ll look more closely at where Harley went wrong—and what it can do to regain market share in the future.

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[i] And that growth was inflated due to H-D’s channel-stuffing and winter-financing that inflated 4Q growth and, when the boom ended, had an increasingly severe effect in 1Q and then 2Q shipments.

 

[ii] And then only because H-D was still channel-stuffing and offering winter financing and free storage to dealers. This inflated the number of shipments and making it appear to investors and stockholders that H-D was doing better than it really was. The overflow shipments from the prior year then deflated shipments in the first quarters—and then in the second as demand slowed.

Is there a bad driving gene—and does it have motorcycling/rider ed implications?

According to a University of California, Irvine press release, bad drivers may have their genes to blame.

The press release summarizes a study published recently in the journal Cerebral Cortex led by UCI researchers found people with a certain gene variation performed more than 20% worse on a driving test than those without the gene and then did worse than other participants when they returned four days later to take the test again—and they also retained less of what they had learned.

The study had 29 people learn to navigate “tough-to-navigate curves and turns” on a simulator “track” designed by UCI researchers.Seven of the participants (24%) had the gene variant and 22 didn’t. The test involved driving 15 laps while “[r]esearchers recorded how well they stayed on the course over time.” All participants returned four days later to retake the test.

The study states that about 30% of Americans have the gene.

The study found that with that gene variation did worse learning and then they did worse recalling what they had learned according to the senior author, Dr. Steven Cramer, neurology associate professor at the University of California at Irvine.

“This gene variant limits the availability of a protein called brain-derived neurotrophic factor during activity. BDNF keeps memory strong by supporting communication among brain cells and keeping them functioning optimally. When a person is engaged in a particular task, BDNF is secreted in the brain area connected with that activity to help the body respond.”

Earlier research had found that those with the gene variant “a smaller portion of the brain is stimulated when doing a task than in those with a normal BDNF gene.”[i]

“Behavior derives from dozens and dozens of neurophysiologic events, so it’s somewhat surprising this exercise bore fruit,” Cramer said.

Clearly, it’s early days yet—more studies would have to be done and, as Cramer pointed out, it’s unknown if this translates to crashes or not.

Iow, up to 30% of American drivers may have the “bad driver” gene—a lesser ability to learn at least more complicated driving skills and perform them competently and a lesser ability to retain what they learned.

Though this study was done using car drivers, it could be that the results would translate to learning to operate a motorcycle and riding it in traffic.

For years now, rider educators have complained that student quality has deteriorated. Many claim a larger number of students do not learn as well and/or perform as well.[ii] But it could be that there is a “bad rider gene”—or rather, those who have the bad driver gene also make bad riders but the public perception of riding and the way training was done didn’t keep bad drivers off the roads but kept bad riders off of motorcycles:

In the past—when instructors claimed student quality was higher—riders had a negative public image as well as dangerous. Because of the dangerous reputation, it could be that it attracted those who were more skillful drivers—ones without the gene variation.

But two factors also may have kept those without the gene variant from finishing the course or, if they did, riding on the roads:

In the prior curriculum, students were almost always counseled to drop the course if they fell once whether any injury was sustained or not. Also, in the previous curriculum the course was almost always taught over two weekends or several days (or evenings in some places). Although retention wasn’t directly tested, it was indirectly revealed.

It could be that even though no one knew there really was a bad driver gene those with it revealed themselves by poor performance and retention and were counseled out before they continued on to an injury crash on the range or in real life. It could be then that fewer students with the bad driver gene took the course—and of those who did dropped out before graduating or going on to ride.

This latest boom changed the image of a riders—and the changes in the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s curriculum set out to give the impression learning was both fun and easy. It may be that a greater percentage of those with the bad driver gene took the course.

But Motorcycle Safety Foundation also had changed the course in three important ways:

• It was now generally taught in 2.5 days—and some places taught it even in less time than that. Needed retention was a matter of hours not days.
• MSF also strongly encouraged instructors to allow students to continue on no matter how many falls they had until the student counseled themselves out.
• The curriculum also was dumbed down, according to many rider educators including less repetitions of skills and less difficult corners, lower speeds, etc.

Yet the bad driver gene study showed that poor performance over repeated laps revealed the bad driver gene.

It could be, then, that the percentage of bad students hasn’t changed but that changes in how instructors are instructed to coach and changes in how students are taught allow more of those with the bad rider gene to progress both to the point of serious injury or to graduate and end up in crashes on the road.

Hopefully, more research will be done on drivers—and some research at all be done on riders.

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[i] It also noted that people with the variant also don’t recover as well after a stroke However, when it comes to neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s, Huntington’s and multiple sclerosis, those with the gene variant keep their mental acuity longer.

 

[ii] Even though the reported deterioration was simultaneous with the change in curriculum to the Motorcycle Safety Foundation’s Basic RiderCourse and an increasing number of subpar ranges and an increasing number of instructors who were trained using the new instructor’s curricula

Near Miss Accident Survey

A new study was published today—the Near Miss Accident Survey of Riders.

According to the report, “The purpose of the survey was to find out from motorcyclists, whether they had experienced situations in which they believed they could have crashed and/or been injured (but were able to keep control of their motorcycle) as well as the type of situations they had experienced.”

Near-misses are critically important because the rider both believed a crash couldn’t occurred but it didn’t–thus resulting in safer riding. Why near misses occur tells us information about why actual crashes happen–and may yield information in how to avoid crashes in the future.

An internet survey of 257 motorcyclists in Ireland (Northern and Southern) and Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) was conducted by Right To Ride, a Northern Ireland motorcycle rights group.

Profile of the respondent

The average respondent to the survey was a 40-year old male who had completed a basic training course. Basic training is mandatory (Compulsory Basic Training) in Southern Ireland and Great Britain. It is not in Northern Ireland. About 24% had taken an advanced course and another 38.9% had taken an “assessment course” like Bikesafe.

89.5% had taken a practical riding test. Over 99% were licensed with the vast majority having a full license (93.4%). (UK countries have graduated licensing including provisional and restricted and full tiers).

The average rider had ridden a motorcycle between 4,000 to 6,000 miles per year without a break in riding for 10 years. Almost 89% always rode in the summer with spring (70.4%) and autumn (65.8%) following. Almost half always rode in the winter with most of those using their bikes for commuting.

The motorcycle was, on average 7.5 years old and the majority (69.1%) rode adventure/sport/enduro/naked street bikes and were represented proportionally in near miss events. 82.9% of the respondents rode motorcycles with engine sizes between 401cc and 1200cc.

Almost half (45.1%) used their motorcycle for personal leisure and 38.9% for commuting to and from work.

(For USA readers’ background information, helmets are mandatory in all three survey areas.)

Crashing and near missing

Of those 257 riders, 78.2% of the respondents reported such near-miss events, 22.6% had had a non-injury crash in the past 24 months. Of all crashes reported, 49% were single vehicle crashes and 51% were multi-vehicle—which is roughly the USA percentages for types of crashes.

Of riders in injury crashes 62.9% reported that they were in multi-vehicle collisions and 37.1% had experienced a single vehicle crashes (4 did not answer).

Interestingly, there was no statistical difference between those who had taken either the assessment course or advanced training when it came to crashing without injury:

20% of those who taken an assessment course vs. 19.7% who had taken an advanced training course had a non-injury crash within 24 months.

Fewer riders who had taken either the assessment or advanced training had an injury crash: 15% of those who took an assessment course had a crash with injury and 16.4% who had done an advanced training course.

Iow, both means produced about the same results when it came to non-injury or injury crashes and 5% fewer injury crashes v. non-injury crashes.

However, when it came to those who hadn’t taken an assessment or advanced training it gets even more interesting:

Of those who did not take an assessment course, 24.5% had non-injury crashes—or 4.5% more than those who had taken the course. While that’s less than 5%, it still suggests that training or at least evaluation makes a difference.

However, it’s a different story when it comes to injury crashes—undoubtedly more serious in effect (though admittedly a non-injury crash may only have avoided injury by random factors).

Of those who hadn’t taken an assessment course 15.2% had an injury crash—which is virtually identical to the 15% of those who had.

And when it came to advanced course participation, only 14.9% who hadn’t taken an advanced course had an injury crash—or 1.5% fewer than who had taken an advanced training course.

Iow, we don’t find the difference we’d expect to find if further training/evaluation did make riders safer on the road. That was not observed by the writer of the report, Dr. Elaine Hardy.

This, however, supports what other researchers have found about training in the USA and Australia—it does not have an observable safety effect in injury crashes.

What the survey found

In brief, what the report finds is what riders would expect it to find:

A 2004 Department of Transport study that examined 1,790 accidents found that  38% involved Right Of Way Violations (ROWVs). “However, less than 20% of these

involve a motorcyclist who rated as either fully or partly to blame for the accident.” This, as the Near-Miss report states, is higher than the Hurt Study found. Other causes garnered far less than 5% each of responses.

In this survey, when it came to the cause of those near misses:

• 40.6% reported “turning into your path from a side road, private driveway or opposite direction”.
• 15.2% reported someone changing lanes in front of them “on the motorway”.
• 13.9% reported on-coming traffic in their lane.
• 12.5% “reported cutting you off at a junction” (or intersection for us Americans).
• Road conditions were the other major cause of near-misses:
• 45.3% cited slippery or loose road surface or loose gravel.
• 34.7% potholes and grooves.

32.1% road markings or over-banding (as far as I can tell, “over-banding” means the strip of bituminous material to repair joints and cracks resulting in a smooth, often slick surface).

Of those respondents who had near misses (five cited more than one cause):

• 61.5% considered the other vehicle (mainly car) as the cause of the near miss
• 9% considered the near miss to be their own fault
• 7.7% considered the conditions of the road as the cause of the near miss
• 3.8% considered animals on the road as the cause of the near miss
• 3.8% considered a pedestrian as the cause of the near miss
• 2.6% considered another motorcycle(s) as the cause of the near miss
• 1.3% considered a bicycle as the cause of the near miss
• 10.3% gave “other” reasons or comments.

Focus Group input

The second part of the study was a focus group that discussed the survey findings. The participants were drawn mainly from the motorcycle safety and training community: a Chief Regional Tester for RoSPA in the Republic of Ireland, a Ballymena Rider Training, Instructor and IAM Observer and a Bikesafe Coordinator; and motorcycle rights officers—a former General Secretary, Road Safety Officers and Senior Training Officer. And a UK/Technical Officer Federation of European Motorcyclists Associations) Northern Ireland.

While they agreed with the need to address road infrastructure (and other road conditions), of note was what they had to say about both public PR campaigns to raise motorist/motorcyclist awareness and the marketing/advertising campaigns by motorcycle manufacturers.

The group was divided between how people reacted to “hard-hitting” commercials. Some felt that people would just avoid it by switching channels and “and that advertising of that nature needed to have a message that is factual, relevant and educational.” Others thought that even if they did turn off dramatic message, the point would still sink in.

But, when it came to how manufacturers advertised motorcycles, the group felt, “All participants indicated that the advertising of performance motorcycles by  manufacturers and magazines had a negative effect on rider attitude and behaviour and that this influence was an underlying cause of motorcycle crashes.”

The experts on training

“The view of the participants was that there is a systemic failure on the part of the authorities in all three countries to provide adequate training and relevant testing for motorcyclists and car drivers.”  This is especially significant since training and testing is far more rigorous in the UK than in the USA and there’s a significant portion of both that’s conducted in traffic.

As one participant observed: “In reality motorcyclists and car drivers need a system in place to fully prepare them to ride or drive on all types of today’s roads in different conditions. The system that we have in place at present does not do that. Over the last 3 years 70% of collisions and just over 70% of road users’ fatalities and serious injuries have happened in a rural environment. In stark contrast 70% – 80% of instruction, guidance and testing are carried out within an urban environment. The current scheme is not reflective of the types of driving that drivers and riders are engaged in post test.”

The focus group thought that more people didn’t take advanced training or assessment courses because it was too expensive and/or people didn’t think it was important. That there was no significant statistical difference between those who had and those who hadn’t when it came to any kind of (survivable) crash may be exactly why more riders don’t think its important—somehow, on a gut level, they may sense that in their own experience—more training doesn’t make a significant difference?

MSF has extended its Discovery Project for another year—but at the halfway point, MSF wasn’t getting the results they wanted—MSF training products weren’t showing further training was effective or that they could easily get people to come back for more. It will be interesting is MSF’s study of its own product (that the taxpayers paid for almost half) comes up with different results that so many other studies—including this last one.

At some point, rider educators are going to have to accept that study after study cannot be wrong and that there’s something wrong with the curricular products currently available. Or they may have to think outside the box and figure out why training doesn’t make riders safer and what kind of training would.

Unfortunately, while the report gives us information about the causes of near-misses, it doesn’t explore why the crash didn’t occur–how the rider avoided the crash successfully–and that’s the critical issue when it comes to increasing rider safety. It is to be hoped that Right to Ride will continue to explore near-misses along those lines in the future.

When it comes to Harley, “it ain’t the economy, stupid”

Harley has been the darling of MBA programs and marketers since it’s extraordinary turnaround in the mid-1980s after management bought out the company from American Machinery and Foundry Incorporated (AMF).

AMF, who had bought the company in 1969, had taken the already legendary brand and nearly destroyed its viability with both too fast expansion, shoddy production and poor quality control. Harley’s reputation by the early 1980s could be summed up by the old joke “most Harleys ever made are still on the road…waiting for the tow truck to pick them up.”

It took several years to turn Harley-Davidson around and restore its mechanical reputation and another decade to reinvent its public image into one seen as a highly desirable, premium and exclusive lifestyle purchase. This was reflected in its stock price:

On October 16, 1986—five years after the AMF buyout—the stock was trading for $0.25 a share.

Ten years later to the day it was trading for $11.68.

Jump ahead to Oct. 16, 2006, and the price had risen to $66.70

A few months after that, the stock hit its all-time high of over $72 per share.

That remarkable turnaround and growth was rewarded: In 2001, Harley became the only motorcycle manufacturer elected to the Marketing Hall of Fame—a prestigious award sponsored by the New York American Marketing Association, which honors “brands that have established themselves as true icons by achieving enduring, sustained success in the marketplace and that have contributed to the marketing discipline through their pioneering practices.”

It joined brands such as Barbie and Budweiser, Coke and Marlboros, McDonald’s and Visa in the “Classic Brands” category that only honors brands “that have enjoyed continuous success for 25 years or more”. Harley then celebrated it’s 100 year anniversary in 2003. It certainly seemed as though its star would continue to rise.

But by January 27, 2009, HOG stock hit a low of $11.69—almost the exact same price as it was in 1996.[i] Like many of the corporations on the stock market, Harley appears to be rebounding. It closed yesterday, Friday, October 15, 2009 at $27.86. While that’s quite a comeback, it hasn’t come back as much as analysts predicted it would at this point. And, as Harley’s press release stated, it plans on even more draconian measures to stop the bleeding—including cutting production even more.

Nowhere, perhaps, is the fall of Harley more evident than what the third quarter motorcycle shipments reveal: In 2009 only 132,849 H-D’s were shipped compared to 226,898 in 2008.

The easy answer to Harley’s Icarus-like descent is because people don’t buy discretionary luxuries in a recession—particularly one that’s as expensive as many cars.  Once the recession is over, many stockholders believe, Harley will rise again. They particularly believe that after two analysts RBC Capital and Wells Fargo & Co. upgraded the stock to outperform last week.[ii] All that it takes is continuing to restructure operating costs, selling MV Augusta, dropping Buell, and Harley rebuying stock and all will be well. “It was the economy, stupid” is the thinking.

But as most easy answers are, the recession explanation doesn’t hold up to examination:

Historically, motorcycle sales aren’t related to recessions

AMF bought H-D in 1967 when the company was at the point of bankruptcy. By the early-mid 1970s, the country was in a recession. Interest rates rose through out the decade to a high of 20% and unemployment was 9% for many months in mid-decade. However, motorcycle registrations jumped from 2.8 million in 1970 to almost 5 million in 1975—a 76% increase.

In the early 1980s, the country was very much like today: in a recession and Harley sales were declining. However, just as in the 1970s, motorcycle registrations were at their highest—a height not equaled for another 20 years even though the prime rate was over 15% and unemployment soared to 10.8% in the autumn of 1982 and stayed there for months.

Clearly, the recession wasn’t affecting motorcycle registrations. Instead, the reverse seems to be true: in the mid-late 1980s, as employment improved, the prime rate dropped motorcycle sales and registrations dropped swiftly.

Rather, Harley’s difficulties were caused by AMF’s blundering mismanagement in the 1970s—a blinding ignorance of what the motorcycling community valued and how to position the brand as well as abysmally low production and quality control standards—that almost drove the company into bankruptcy. It was also a decade of foolish choices—Harley’s move into snowmobiles, lawnmowers and boats—all of which ultimately failed to transfer brand loyalty. As in this current recession, Harley’s bad shape in the 1980s recession coincided with it rather than was caused by it.

In the brief 1990-1991 recession, the prime rate was about 10%. Unemployment continued to rise to a high of 7.9% by mid-1992. In the very year that unemployment was the highest (and didn’t drop to roughly 5% until 1997) was the same year the most recent motorcycle boom began.

While not all experts would agree there was a recession in 2001, it met many of the requirements[iii] and was characterized by extensive layoffs, outsourcing, and a jobless recovery. Once again, during the “recession” motorcycle sales and registrations zoomed upward.

In short, in four out of four of the past economic downturns, motorcycle registrations did not mimic the recession. Rather registrations rose during or remained high or peaked during the worst of the recession and fell as the economy improved. Investors in any motorcycle manufacturer would be wise to be aware of that.

That doesn’t mean that there weren’t boom and bust cycles in motorcycle sales—it’s just that they weren’t easily associated with the broader economic cycle.

Then what’s going on with Harley-Davidson?

No doubt about it—the precipitous plunge of HOG stock price last fall through early February had a great deal to do with last fall’s Wall Street crisis—all kinds of stock prices fell as the market sought a new bottom. But no matter what problems Harley had and has, it didn’t deserve to fall that far that fast. But it did deserve to fall quite a bit because recession are sooner ended than motorcycle bust cycles.

In many ways, the recession masked what was already occurring—Harley was already slowing down and would’ve continued to slow down quickly even if there hadn’t been a recession. The recession simply masked what would’ve happened anyhow and will continue to happen for a number of years.

A couple basics must be recalled: The summer of 2008 saw soaring gas prices, but unemployment was barely edging up.[iv] While heavyweight motorcycle sales dropped, scooter sales soared and training classes were jammed in many states (except Harley-Davidson’s Rider’s Edge classes) But it wasn’t just Rider’s Edge that was suffering—simply put people who want to save money on gas don’t buy motorcycles that cost as much as new cars. Harley had nothing to sell that economy riders wanted and they were the ones buying.

Motorcycle shipments also traditionally go up in the second and third quarters. The second quarter corresponds with the beginning of the riding season and the third quarter shipments reflect the new model year.

As you see, however, Harley’s 2009 second quarter was down 27.57% and third quarter shipments were down 27.39% from 2008—but 2008’s 2Q were down 15.55% and 3Q were down 13.67% from 2007 and the 3Q was down 10.8% from 2006.

Japanese motorcycle manufacturers’ 2008 USA 3Q shipments were also down (15.13%) from 2007—which were also down from 2006 (27.8%). According to the chart on webbikeworld (scroll way down till you get to it) [v] 2005 marked the apex of this latest cycle for motorcycle sales—even though, according to the Bureau of Traffic Statistics registrations continued to rise.

However many economists believe the current recession began at the end of 2007 by—almost three years after motorcycle sales peaked and began to fall even though all manufacturers were writing subprime loans and credit was easy.

In fact, if the major manufacturers hadn’t done the exact same thing—writing too many subprime loans and securitizing those bad loans—that mortgage lenders did with houses, the boom would’ve turned bust that much sooner.

Iow, recessions don’t drive motorcycle boom and bust cycles—something analysts and stockholders would be wise to keep in mind. Just because the recession is over and unemployment drops doesn’t mean that motorcycle sales will rebound for several years. In the USA, the boom and bust cycle arise from what’s happening in society and are culturally driven responses that consequently have economic effects—more on that one day.

Much of Harley’s suffering now and in the future, however, comes from an abysmal lack of understanding of the brands and mismanagement of them—and that lack of understanding of what makes someone ride and how to manage the brand will doom them in the next major boom. That’s what the next entry is about.

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[i] Though it closed that day at $12.35.

[ii] Wells Fargo, incidentally, received $25 billion in TARP bailout funds and hasn’t repaid it yet—and, of course,  Wells Fargo Advisors was Wachovia Securities–part of a company that lost billions in reckless risk-taking. So,  whether they’re as good at analyzing stock as they were at managing the rest of their business is anyone’s guess

[iii] In the USA there were not two consecutive periods of negative growth, which is why the period in 2001 was not called a recession.

[iv] Unemployment was still below 6% in July, 2008 and still only 6.2% in September and only after that began to go up rapidly.

[v] Otoh, BMW, Ducati and Aprilia sold more motorcycles than previously.

H-D in a financial endo

Shortly after announcing the Buell Blast would no longer be produced, H-D announced the entire Buell line would be no more. A heart-wrenching announcement from Eric Buell is available here.

As other media reports, this means that 80 production jobs and 100 administrative jobs will be lost just before Christmas and joins the other 1,00 jobs lost at other H-D plants this year. Admittedly it’s a small number in the big USA job loss picture but surely not small for those employees who join the millions out of work.

And just over a year after Harley-Davidson bought MV Augusta for roughly $110 million USD, the Motor Company announced today that it was selling the European motorcycle manufacturing group.

The radical about face is just part of Harley’s press release on its third-quarter report:

The company went from an operating profit of $35.6 million in the third quarter of 2008 to an operating loss of $31.5 million for the third quarter of 2009—or a change of $67.2 million.

The financial services subsidiary, HDFS, went from an operating income of $107.7 million in this quarter last year to an operating loss of $110.8 million this year.

In the past nine months, H-D shipped 187,085 motorcycles compared to 226,898 motorcycles in 2008 with revenue falling from $3.23 billion in 2008 in motorcycle shipments to $2.62 billion.

U.S. retail heavyweight motorcycle sales declined 38.7 percent year to date in 2009, compared to 2008.

Net income for the third quarter was $26.5 million, compared to $166.5 million in the third quarter of 2008, which is an 84.1 percent decline in net income.

Diluted earnings per share were $0.11 for the third quarter of 2009 compared to  $0.71 in the year-ago period—or to put it another way—an 84.5 percent decline in diluted earnings per share from the year-ago quarter.

New CEO Keith Wandell put the best face he could on the bleak picture: “While the environment remains challenging for us, we are mildly encouraged by the moderation in the decline of dealer retail Harley-Davidson motorcycle sales.”

Wandell was brought in to replace James Zeimer who lead the Motor Company from the heights to the depths in just four short years. Zeimer wasn’t the only one to lose his job—Thomas Bergmann who was brought in to take Zeimer’s place as CFO and then took over for Donna Zarcone who led the way into Harley’s wild subprime loan underwriting strategy that resulted in almost a third of all the loans being subprime. Harley lost tens of millions in defaulted loans.

James McCaslin was demoted from President of Harley to Executive V-P of Product of product planning and development.

Ironically, perhaps, Harley had moved Matthew S. Levatich from MV Augusta to take McCaslin’s spot and hired Enrico D’Onofrio away from Ducati to take Levatich’s job. Lucky, perhaps, for Levatich—not so lucky from D’Onofrio.

The game of corporate musical chairs, however, did not help the beleaguered company that had, in a great many ways, played the same fast and loose subprime/securitization game that has caused so much devastation in our economy over the past year.

Still, the iconic Motor Company appears that it will make a profit in a very tough year.

Harley explains it’s decision to drop both the Buell and MV Augusta lines as a decision to focus on the Harley brand only by “leveraging unique Harley-Davidson strengths.”

The company’s press release did not address the future of its dealership-based, corporate controlled motorcycle training program, Rider’s Edge. Harley had previously announced that it would continue to produce the Buell Blast–without the name–as a training motorcycle.

Did MSF have more to do with Rider’s Edge than we thought?

You may have noticed in the prior entry on the simultaneous approval of both the Blast and Rider’s Edge that four of the nine classes (44%) that comprised the Rider’s Edge field-test were conducted in Albuquerque, NM.

The photo of what would be called the Buell Blast showing them in a training exercise was taken in mid-November and posted by The Single Cylinder Gazette on Wednesday, November 24, 1999.

However the range appears to be the very same one that appeared in the infamous marketing video sent out by the Motorcycle Safety Foundation to introduce its new curriculum iteration, the Basic RiderCourse.

That range was part of the New Mexico State Motorcycle Program. And the NMSMP was (and still is) administrated by MSF.

According to Michael Weiss, H-D Director of Business Development in that phone call to state program rider educators, David Smith and Frank Allen were the ones to contact for how Rider’s Edge instructors would “bleed over” in terms of Rider’s Edge and state programs.  Iow, Smith and Allen were the experts on Rider’s Edge instructors.

David Smith and Frank Allen were employees of MSF at the time the spy photo was taken and working on another field-test for MSF in Albuquerque at the same time—more on that in a moment. Smith has been the New Mexico state motorcycle safety program manager for several years even though, at least until a couple years ago, he also taught for Rider’s Edge in Albuquerque.

For many months after the Milwaukee SMSA, Rider’s Edge was a source of controversy and confusion in the rider education community. It might have reassured many in the rider ed community if they knew that  MSF-employed instructors were evaluating the course and the motorcycle.

It appears that MSF was much more deeply involved than suspected with the origins of Rider’s Edge if only because it was administrator of the NMSMP and employed Smith and Allen. Yet it made every effort to distance itself from Harley and Rider’s Edge and would only admit that Harley had permission to use MSF’s curriculum.

For example, Piper posted this on the MSF listserve on Aug 25, 2000: “Harley-Davidson and its Rider’s Edge New Rider Course do not intend to “compete” with existing rider training through the state programs….From the MSF viewpoint, we’re pleased at the effort Harley-Davidson is making to help us address the training capacity issue and to expose non-riders to motorcycling.”

There’s only one place where I discovered any admitted connection (apart from the curriculum use) between MSF and H-D and Rider’s Edge: An e-mail from Albert Thornton, then chair of the SMSA, with the subject head “Chat with Tim Buche on 29 July 1999” to Ron Shepard states “Tim also indicated that the MSF will be assisting Harley-Davidson “with some research this winter” and that HD will be laying [sic— I think he meant playing] a bigger role. (???????)”.  After Milwaukee, Thornton may not have needed the question marks.

The question is: why did TPTB at MSF and/or H-D feel it was important to maintain an illusion of a Chinese Wall when news of a deeper involvement with MSF may have reassured nervous instructors?

Was the Blast and Rider’s Edge testing also passed off as BRC field-testing?

What few readers may realize is that Albuquerque did over 70% of the 1999 BRC field-tests) for the Basic RiderCourse.[i] And those 19 sets of range exercises were conducted between the end of June and December 1999. Thirteen of them (over 68% of all the field tests) were taught by David Smith, his son Mark Smith and Frank Allen from August-December.

Iow, at the same time that Harley-Davidson was conducting the field-test for both Rider’s Edge curriculum and the Buell Blast as a training bike on an MSF range in Albuquerque with MSF employees, David Smith and Frank Allen they were simultaneously conducting field tests on MSF’s Basic RiderCourse.

That overlap of field-tests includes the same weekend, on the same range that the couple snapped the photo of the top-secret Buell used in training in Albuquerque.

David Smith, Mark Smith and Frank Allen in a memo to Ray Ochs dated May 19, 2000 refers to BRC field tests conducted “using normally scheduled classes”. It is assumed that the same policy was followed in the fall since the class sizes were similar.

According to MSF documentation that weekend, November 19-21, there were six students in the class that was held (the photo shows five though one may be out of sight on the right hand portion of the circle).

And, according to MSF, the course that was being conducted was the curriculum that it was just developing—the Basic RiderCourse—and not the MRC:RSS, which allegedly was the curriculum Rider’s Edge first adapted and field-tested—at least that was the impression the rider ed community was given.

Iow, at the exact time MSF claims it was testing the BRC, Harley claimed it was field-testing Rider’s Edge on the same range with the same instructors.

My friend Thor also claims the picture shows Exercise Six from the MRC: RSS. The photo, then, should be of an MRC:RSS class in motion mid-way through the first range session. He based that on the circle on the range and assumed that the students were riding the circle—however, there’s also yellow markings on the range that may or may not conform the to BRC.

But, according to BRC field-testing documentation, no MRC:RSS classes were conducted in Albuquerque in November at all. According to MSF, the only RSS that conducted in Albuquerque in the fall of 1999 was held December 17-19, 1999—almost a month after the pictures of the Blasts were taken and posted on the Internet.[ii]

Iow, if MSF—and Smith and Allen—are to be believed the photo would be of a BRC field test and not an RSS class. But Harley says it was field-testing Rider’s Edge at the same time. So either Harley’s Rider’s Edge was the BRC from the beginning or the instructors who taught the course were confused about which iteration they were teaching that weekend.

Whatever iteration, it was conducted on the Buell Blast.

And remember that Elisabeth Piper said in her February 9, 2000 post that the Blast was currently being tested for use in the New Mexico and Pennsylvania state programs? No training occurs in Pennsylvania in the winter—but it was occurring in NM. And remember, there were only three dealerships that had Buell Blasts at that point—and one of them was in Albuquerque.

But the only MSF training being done in Albuquerque in the winter of 2000 was the BRC field test. Does this mean that at least part of the BRC field test was conducted on Buell Blasts? It’s unknown.

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[i] When MSF sought permission from the Oregon Department of Oregon to be approved as an alternate state program it submitted numerous documents including 74 separate supporting appendices. Number 34 is the RESLAB Component Feasibility Testing: Times and Mileage (Sept-Dec ’99) and lists all the field testing done in the latter part of 1999. Other appendices reveal that no field testing had been done in 1999 prior to September and only a very few field-tests had been done in the fall of 1998 (at Eastern Kentucky State University).

[ii] Interestingly, the one RSS conducted as a control group and to compare against the BRC had 33% more students than the average test BRC course.

Which came first–the Buell Blast or the criteria change?

I’ve been having an interesting side conversation with a rider administrator about the Blast. He and I disagree on many things—but his commitment to and belief in training is beyond doubt. Our discussion began when he wrote, “My recollection is that the training bike criteria changed before the Blast rolled out.” He pointed out that H-D used the old Ford Proving Grounds near Yucca, AZ during the 90s and tested the “Thor” in the late 90s that he said “strongly resembled the eventual Blast.”

He also recollected a “poll” conducted by MSF on what criteria should be used for training bikes that found that the cc. and weight limits should be raised.  Because it amuses me I’ll call him Thor.

After relying on memory for the first couple exchanges, I went back to the old MSF listserv on Topica then went to my files and pulled out the relevant documents and then did a little more finding this and that. What I found among all those things might be of interest to my readers:

As I said before, Harley re-joined MSF in 1999.[i]

The rider education community first officially heard about what would become Rider’s Edge, at the 1999 SMSA Annual Meeting in Milwaukee in late August. According to a letter from H-D from Wayne Curtain and Michael Weiss[ii] to “Fellow SMSA Members/State Administrators” dated March 9, 2000.  Harley “presented a very high level outline of Harley-Davidson’s plan to become more involved in rider education” at that conference.

In August the bike that would become the Blast was still being field-tested itself at—as my friend said—the Ford Proving Grounds.  “Thor” was the code-name for the Blast.

By November, 1999, three dealers had received the new model to use in Motorcycle Safety Foundation training programs. According to The SingleCylinder Gazette, “One dealer in the Southwest supposedly got 14, has a “non-disclosure” agreement with Buell, and employees who snuck some photos had them confiscated.” http://www.gazette9.com/buells.html/upd2.htm

Those dealers, according to Harley’s own documentation on the Rider’s Edge field-tests prepared by Jenne Meyer, were Harley-Davidson of Dothan, AL, Harley-Davidson of Baton Rouge, LA and Chick’s of Albuquerque, NM (Chick’s no longer exists and now Thunderbird H-D/Buell does).

By the time H-D was trying to get dealers to sign on as RE providers and convince state programs to accept RE, however, Dothan’s no longer was on the list of current providers.

According to that internal document by Meyer, RE was tested in a total of 9 classes before being rolled out: Dothan and Baton Rouge, LA offered two classes. Three entire and one partial class were offered in Albuquerque. All tolled—and confirmed by Michael Weiss—Rider’s Edge was tested with a total of 58 students between those 9 classes went through the course. Iow, there was an average of 6.4 students in each class. As you can see in these photos, only 5 students participated in this class. http://www.gazette9.com/buells.html/buelabq.htm

Meanwhile, rumors were flying through the motorcycling world about the new  Buell that now had a name—the Blast. Spy photos were published online and in magazines accompanied by speculations and more rumors.

On February 8,2000, instructor Eric West brought up the Buell Blast, “I am wanting MSF to approve the new Blast for the RSS. What do you think?”

The next day, Feb 09, 2000, Elisabeth Piper who was then, irrc, director of communications (her title changed frequently) wrote:

Re: Buell Blast            Elisabeth Piper

10:06 PST

“The Buell Blast is currently being tested by MSF as a possible training bike for all programs in the New Mexico and Pennsylvania state programs. MSF has already approved use of the Buell Blast for the Harley-Davidson training program [sic] for new riders. This program uses MSF curriculum and the HD sites are RERP sites subject to all the same criteria as sites run under the state program auspices [emphasis mine].

“MSF will be making announcements regarding these two facts in the coming weeks, which will be posted on the website. I will make sure to note that to the listserv so that you’ll know as soon as they are posted.”

During a phone conversation on February 26, 2000—twenty days after Piper’s post—H-D’s Michael Weiss stated that “Tim Buche has told at least one state that the Blasts will be available for general use next year” [emphasis mine]. The statement was so strong it appeared as if it’s already a done deal—the Blast was already approved.

Then, in the H-D letter signed by Curtain and Weiss dated March 9,2000—a month after Piper’s post and a few days after Weiss’ phone call—it stated, “MSF has not approved the Blast for general use in MRC:RSS. However, Harley-Davidson will be providing Buell Blasts motorycles to MSF for additional testing and, if the testing goes well, the Blast could be approved for general MRC:RSS use later this year” [emphasis mine].

H-D officially rolled out the Blast to the riding, business and general media worlds in March, 2000.

A month later, in April, Piper asked what instructors thought of training bike criteria:

“Re: was: Riders edge, now Review of the Blast     Elisabeth Piper

Apr 18, 2000 09:18 PDT

I’ve ridden the Blast too, on the LA Freeways from the westside to the San Gabriel valley, and then up and down Glendora Mountain road a few times. I have to admit that I felt a little puny on the freeway, but the bike had no problem maintain freeway speeds. The mountain roads were fun though.

“If you were going to establish criteria for what a bike must have to be considered good for a training bike, what do you think those points should be? And how important is cc size within that mix of criteria?”

It’s hardly a poll—and doesn’t reference any prior or more official poll by MSF of instructors on acceptable training bike criteria. And only two rider educators responded with their thoughts. 2 out of 5,000 instructors hardly seems to be a representative sample.

In August, Piper announces as a response to another posting:

Re: Legal issues / Buell Blast (LONG!)          Elisabeth Piper

Aug 21, 2000 11:04 PDT

“You might be interested to know that at the end of last week, the MSF Board of Trustees approved the new parameters set for training bikes, parameters for which the Buell Blast qualifies.

I’ll be putting the parameters and a list of bikes that meet them on the website by the end of the month.”

So, in this regard, I was correct and my friend Thor misremembered: there was no real poll of what instructors thought or wanted for training bike criteria and the Blast was not just rolled out but already being used in rider training prior to the Board changing the criteria.

If you were observant, however, you’ll have noticed a few things:

The private-manufacturer owned and dealer-administrated training course and motorcycle that’s associated with more near-fatal and fatal training crashes was

made based on the experience of only 58 students.

And those 58 took the class with less than the full complement of 12 students on the range but with two instructors. As all rider educators know, there’s a huge difference in how a class runs depending on how full it is.

This also means that the RE version of the MSF-designed curriculum and the motorcycle were both being simultaneously field-tested in the same less-than-full classes. That’s very poor research methodology.

Then there’s the issue of MSF approving the motorcycle—it had been approved for H-D but would be tested. It has been tested and will be further tested. If it passes it will be available—but Buche already said it will be available—and therefore it would mean it was already known it would be approved even though the testing hadn’t been done.

However, the plot has only begun to thicken—stay tuned.

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[i] Stories vary as to why Harley left but only this friend, Thor, claims that H-D had tried to re-join MSF for years and wasn’t allowed—he gave no proof of that claim and is the only one I’ve heard make it.

[ii] Michael Weiss gives his title as Director of Business Development and Wayne Curtain gave his title as “Manager of Motorcycle Safety Program Relations”. However, Curtain had started at H-D a month before with the title “Manager of Government Affairs” and was Director of Government Affairs for years after this letter. In fact, only when dealing with state program administrators in this one lettere did he call himself “Manager of Motorcycle Safety Program Relations”.

MSF’s many mistakes in its perception test

Now that I’ve given readers time to take MSF’s perception tests, there’s a few observations I’d like to make. It’s nice that MSF realized there was a problem with perception and attempted to do something about it—but there’s a few observations to make—so I’ll use a few of the pictures and responses MSF makes to do so:

The Picture: A traffic signals are ahead of the photographer. A car is on the right but it’s not clear if it’s planning to go straight through the intersection or  planning to turn right or left. The traffic signal on the pole to the right has the pedestrian crossing signal with a countdown—the white lit walking figure has already disappeared and the orange hand is visible and below that the countdown shows 11 seconds.

The statement:

The traffic light will remain green at least:

a. 7 more seconds

b. 11 seconds

c. 17 seconds

MSFs answer: b. Is the correct answer.  Lots going on here, but perhaps you caught the countdown sign below the right traffic light.  It’s letting pedestrians know how much time they have left to cross, but it also lets you know that time is remaining before the light changes.

Commentary:

I have used the pedestrian countdown many a time—but only if there’s nothing else going on around me. In this case, I’d be paying far more attention to whether that white car would suddenly turn out in front of me. And the pedestrian countdown is not universal—in some places the orange hand just flashes and some don’t have it at all. So I’m not sure why MSF thought this was so important as to include in what’s called a “Collision Traps” test.

But, apart from that, what MSF says is correct is inaccurate: In fact, a. is also correct: If the light will remain green for 11 seconds it will first remain green for “at least” 7 seconds. In fact, a. is even more correct since the light will remain green more than 7 seconds and thus “at least” but in 11 seconds the light will turn  yellow and be green no longer—and therefore not meeting the definition of “at least”.

Maybe that’s being too picky—but it’s MSF who claims the answers it chooses are “correct” and correct, as MSF uses it means right, accurate, without error. And if there’s a “correct” then there’s an incorrect—that there’s a red “X” next to your choice confirms the idea there’s a right and a wrong and MSF’s answer is the right one (“Correct. Good Job!”—that last is such an MSF cliché.)

MSF also makes an implied claim on the main page of its perception tests that taking the tests it provides will make a rider safer on the road precisely by “trying until you consistently earn a perfect score of 20 out of 20 points.”

So what MSF puts on the page—a page that can be accessed globally—matters even when it comes to small inaccuracies such as “at least” because people are told there is a correct answer—and the implication is that they will be safer riders.

So let’s look at a just a couple pictures—and these aren’t the worst by far:

The Picture: A rider  ahead of the photographer is in the middle lane of a three-lane freeway. The photographer is in the right lane. There’s an exit only lane ahead on the right and an entrance lane that has already joined the freeway  on the right . A white van is in the right lane. There is no car visible entering the freeway—not even a shadow of a car.

The Statement:

In a few seconds ahead you will be:

a. Stopping at a red light

b. Merging

c. Changing lanes left.

MSFs answer: b. Is the correct answer.  There is a lane on the right that indicates vehicles may be merging with you ahead.  Be sure to leave a gap both in front and behind you so a driver will be able to choose a safe gap to merge.

There’s many things wrong with this picture:

Merging is what the entering vehicle does—so the photographer wouldn’t be merging at all. If there was a vehicle entering the freeway, the photographer would have to deal with the merging vehicle, which is what, I presume, MSF meant. However, “in a few seconds” you’ll be at least 300 feet down the road and long past any merging point. Is this, once again, just sloppy writing—“merging” and “in a few seconds”? No—there’s more:

In fact, there is nothing in the entrance lane to indicates that “you” will be dealing with an entering vehicle in “a few seconds”—unless, of course, that road sign casting a shadow on the entrance ramp is planning to zoom on the freeway.

While it’s true that merging traffic is a hazard, this picture doesn’t show it. In the absence of any indication of a vehicle entering the freeway, it’s at best, merely cautionary in the abstract.

In fact, the greatest potential hazard in the photographer is the motorcyclist ahead in the next lane. Since there is an exit coming up on the right, the rider could pull over into the photographer’s lane intending to move to the exit. But rather than deal with an actual potential risk, MSF goes for the absent threat and calls that correct.

The Picture: It’s a three-lane major arterial street with red lights ahead, a white SUV is attempting to merge into the middle lane from a left entrance. A white locksmith van has its brake lights on directly ahead of the photographer in the middle lane. Interestingly, another photo shows the same locksmith van doing the same maneuver as the SUV—pulling across more than one lane to force its way into another. There is no traffic in the right lane or beside the photographer.

You are asked:

A good plan to execute here is:

a. Change lanes to the left

b. Increase your following distance.

c. Actuate your brake lights.

MSFs answer: c. Is the correct answer.  The SUV pulling out from the left is causing the van in front of you to slow.  This is a good time to let people behind know there’s a potential conflict ahead.  And if there is traffic directly behind you, be alert for them to change lanes to pass by you.

First of all, MSF teaches the 2 second following rule, however, in most of the pictures, it appears that the photographer is far closer than 2 seconds at the various speeds the kind of roads would indicate—as is the case in previous picture and this one. So, if the photographer was using the 2 second following rule, s/he would’ve traveled between 88 feet (if going 30 mph) to 102 feet (if traveling 35 mph—which is a typical speed limit for that kind of street in the LA area).

Then there’s the red light ahead—and the photographer’s view of traffic in his/her lane is obscured by the locksmith van. For all the we know, traffic is backed up to the van and it’s coming to a complete stop.

So it’s really bizarre that MSF tells you that it’s a good time to let people behind you know by actuating your brake lights? Friend, you better be on those brakes so you don’t rear-end the van. Answer b is by far the safest action.

But even answer a would give you at least one more van length to come to a stop (and the SUV might have finished crossing) rather than risk hitting the van. At any rate, imo, a rider should always avoid having the view forward blocked by a larger vehicle.

And even though the right lane appeared to be clear for many car lengths, it was not a choice MSF gave—even though it could be the absolute safest (as it allows the rider not only an unobscured forward vision but allows an escape route to the shoulder—that is if there’s no one beside the photographer or coming up in that lane.

Full Frontal

But as in the last picture, there’s simply not enough information to know what the best and safest thing to do is because—as in all of the photos, all the viewer can see is what’s in front of the photographer. Essential information is lost because what’s behind the rider is not known and often what’s to both sides of the rider isn’t either.

For example, in one of the photos taken along Vegas’ Strip, a white SUV is pulling out in front of the photographer from what appears to be a parking lot. There’s a great deal of  the sidewalk and area the SUV is pulling out of but none to the immediate left of the rider.

MSF asks what the rider should do and gives the choices as: a. slow. B. Change lanes to the left. C. Use your horn. The “correct” answer, according to MSF is to change lanes to the left: “Slowing is a good idea, but a better choice would be to move to the left lane and avoid other traffic that wants to turn into your lane. Using your horn wouldn’t have much value.”

It’s true that using the horn would be useless, but since we can’t see to the rider’s left, it’s anyone’s guess that the safest thing to do would be to move left. And MSF doesn’t say to check and see if you can move left before you do.

But even if they had—and someone took MSF’s assertion that this is the correct thing to do, consider this: The SUV appears to be less than 90 feet away from the  photographer (and in most of the photos, it doesn’t appear that the photographer is using a 2 second following rule).

According to brain science research it would take about 1.5 seconds to see the SUV, interpret what it’s going to do, decide what you’re going to do and then do a shoulder check, interpret and decide on that information. Only then would the rider be starting to move over. In that time, the rider would be 66 feet closer to the SUV if s/he was going 30 mph—and only then realize they couldn’t move over—just before they smashed into the SUV. Otoh, in the same length of time and distance, s/he could have slowed to a stop if necessary.

Iow, MSF’s advice—since it doesn’t include essential information to the side and rear—could cause a collision rather than save a rider from it. And that’s true for many of the photos. More importantly is that MSF’s repeated ignoring of what’s going on to the sides and rear of the photographer conveys the message that only what’s in front of the motorcyclist is important.

This, then is  a subtle but insidious and dangerous aspects of the Collision Trap Test—while the majority of fatalities are frontal collisions, safe avoidance of those collisions very often depends on what’s directly to the sides of us and behind us.

Other very strange things include a strong focus on what the speed limit is—including one on the freeway (65 mph). If the photographer was going freeway speed, the “Collision Trap” would be the multi-lane brake check ahead that requires immediate action. Yet MSF uses this photo to say, well, the speed limit sign isn’t important here but it’s still good to know what the limit is supposed to be.

In fact, this is a case where, if the rider was going 65 mph, should be getting on the brakes instead of noticing the speed limit.

There’s an enormous amount of errors and foolishness in the commentary beyond these:  in one the commentator says the rider isn’t “quite” in the no-zone. On the contrary, the rider is well inside it. In one case where the photographer is in a straight road heading over a blind crest with a corner beyond, MSF says the correct thing is to stay left for sight lines. Not in this case since the rider could not tell if an on-coming driver was over the double yellow.

I myself haven’t run into anything but the most basic of all kinds of corners—yet going out of control on a bend is one of the most common causes of collisions.

I don’t know who chose the pictures (or told the photo what kind of pictures to take), I don’t know who decided what was the danger or the “correct” action, but the inaccuracies and poor choices that MSF claim are “correct” are truly representative of the inferiority of MSF’s basic rider training curriculum, the Basic Rider Training course.

If this is a sample of the kind of advice instructors are telling students is “correct”, no wonder so many new riders are dying on the roads.

What I want to know is why in hell MSF didn’t beg new AMA Hall of Fame member  David Hough to create this perception test for them…

The Buell Blast will still be the training bike–but without the “Buell” part

Vstromer has news from the SMSA conference that contradicts Eric Buell’s video:

“Contrary to what the Eric Buell video might lead one to believe, the Blast will continue to be manufactured, continue to be used as a training bike in Rider’s Edge classes, and continue to be offered for sale at H-D/Buell dealerships. It will be badged as a Blast, not a Buell, not a Harley, just Blast. This information comes straight from Tim Becker’s mouth at the SMSA business meeting in Madison, WI, on Friday, 8/21/2009. Tim Becker is employed by H-D, and his title is Manager Rider’s Edge.”

Well, Vstromer, that’s interesting. The Blast–when it was a Buell–sold very badly. Over the past four years, the most Buell Blasts were shipped in 2006–but that was only 1,602 motorcycles. Last year, only 1,177 were shipped–26% less than in 2006. I don’t know how many sites Rider’s Edge has now, but I can’t imagine that they will need many bikes every year and I can only imagine the economies at the scale H-D will be operating at supplying only RE sites.

I find it interesting that rather than import a small MV Augusta that would be an ideal training bike, H-D is going to continue to use the Blast…

I also find it alarming that H-D made a conscious and deliberate decision to continue to use a motorcycle associated with so many more injury and fatal crashes than another other single motorcycle out there. I guess TPTB decided the economies of acceptable loss v. profit were worth it.